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ICM Millenium Lectures on Games
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Game Theory and Applications

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 6 * Number 2 * June 2004
CONTENTS
  • Newtonian Mechanics and Nash Play
    S.D. Flam and J. Morgan
  • Formalization of Multi-Level Games
    K. Hausken and R. Cressman
  • Geometry and Computation of the Lorenz Set
    J. Arin, J. Kuipers and D. Vermeulen
  • The Weighted Core with Distinguished Coalitions
    M. Cantisani and E. Marchi
  • The Frgiving Trigger Strategy: An Alternative to the Trigger Strategy
    M. Aramendia, L. Ruiz and F. Valenciano
  • Bargaining Model with Sequences of Discount Rates and Bargaining Costs
    A. Rusinowska
  • Technical Note: Nontransferable Individual Payoffs in Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games
    D.W.K. Yeng
  • Book Review:
    Differential Games in Marketing, by Steffen Jorgensen and Georges Zaccour
    Reviewed by Simon Pierre Sigue

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 6 * Number 1 * March 2004
CONTENTS
  • Introduction: A special issue dedicated to George Leitmann
  • Two Direct Methods for Obtaining Solutions to Variational Problems
    D.A. Carlson
  • An Extension of Leitmann's Direct Method to Inequality Constraints
    P. Cartigny and C. Deissenberg
  • A Game-Theoretic Treatment of a Time-Discrete Emission Reduction Model
    W. Krabs and S. Pickl
  • Sharing tje Benefits of Cooperation in the Norwegian Spring-Spawning Herring Fishery
    M. Lindroos
  • When to Ratify an Environmental Agreement: The Case of High Seas Fisheries
    V. Kaitala and M. Lindroos
  • The G-Function Method for Analyzing Darwinian Dynamics
    T.L. Vincent
  • Differential Games with Semi-Uncertain Dynamics
    S. Clemhout and H. Wan, Jr.
  • Viable Capture Basin for Studying Differenial and Hybrid Games: Application to Finance
    P. Saint-Pierre
  • New Approach to the Collision Avoidance Problem for a Ship
    A. Miele and T. Wang
  • Multystage Cooperative Games and Problem of Time Consistency
    V. Zakharov and M. Dementieva
  • Some Properties of the Bellman-Issacs Equation for the Games on Surfaces of Revolution
    A. Melikyan

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 5 * Number 4 * December 2003
CONTENTS
  • Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games
    P.J.-J. Herings and R.J.A.P. Peeters
  • Regional Fisheries Management on the High Seas: The Hit-And-Run Interloper Model
    R.W. McKelvey, L.K. Sandal and S.I. Stenshamn
  • A Pseudo "Folk" Theorem in the Strategic Provision of Stock Externalities
    Z. Yang
  • The Linear Quadratic Dynamic Game for Discrete-Time Descriptor Systems
    H. Xu and H. Mukaidani
  • Hadamard and Tykhonov Well-Posedness in Two Player Games
    G. Pieri and A. Torre
  • A Note on NTU Convexity and Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes
    R. Hendrickx
  • Book Review:
    Oligopoly Dynamics, edited by Tonu Puu and Irina Sushko
    Reviewed by Georges Zaccour
  • Erratum

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 5 * Number 3 * September 2003
CONTENTS
  • Preface to the Special Issue Evolutionary Game Theory 2000
    Rabah Amir, James Bergin and Thorbjorn Knudsen
  • Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models
    L. Blume and S. Durlauf
  • The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
    T.C. Bergstrom
  • Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation
    P. Gregoire and A. Robson
  • Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
    B. Hehenkamp
  • Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
    C. Alos-Ferrer
  • Imitation Dynamic and Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly with Capacities
    A. Possajennikov

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 5 * Number 2 * June 2003
CONTENTS
  • On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker
    M. Dreff, P. Born and B.V.D. Genugten
  • A Two-Person Conflict Model in Train Scheduling
    K. Ghoseiri, F. Szidarovszky and M.J. Asgharpour
  • From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
    A. Quesada
  • Progressive Current Accounts: Profit-Sharing Interest
    S.C. Rambaud and M. del C.V. Martinez
  • When Will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
    Y. Gerchak and Q.-M. He
  • Verification Theorems for Optimal Feedback Strategies in Differential Games
    S. Mirica
  • A First Course on Zero-Sum Repeated Games, by Sylvain Sorin
    Reviewed by Ferenc Szidarovszky

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 4 * Number 4 * December 2002
CONTENTS
  • Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stability and Gradient Dynamics
    S. D. Flam
  • Complementarity, Substitutability and Strategic Accumulation of Capital
    C. Figuieres
  • Maximum Likelihood Equilibria in Games with Population Uncertainty
    M. Voorneveld
  • A Relation between Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria
    R. Hendrickx, R. Peeters and J Potters
  • Technological Failure, Economic Success
    H. Haller and A. Pavlopoulos
  • Absent-minded Drivers in the Lab: Testing Gilboa's Model
    S. Huck and W. Muller
  • Assessing the Anticompetitive Effect of Mergers for Market Power
    R. Fauli-Oller
  • On the Survival of Cooperation under Different Matching Schemes
    N. Jonard

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 4 * Number 3 * September 2002
CONTENTS
  • Egalitarian Sets for TU-Games
    J.Arin and E. Inarra
  • Some Results on (Pre)Kernel Catchers and the Coincidence of the Kernel with Prekernel
    C. Chang and C.-H. Lian
  • Classification of Types of Societal Conflicts and Characterization of Their Resolution Processes Based on Deontic Logic
    O. Katai, K. Toda and H. Kawakami
  • On the Complexity of Coalitional Reasoning
    M. Pauly
  • Strong Nash Equilibrium in Multistage Games
    L. A. Petrosjan and L. V. Grauer
  • Cores of Stochastic Cooperative Games with Stochastic Orders
    F. R. Fernandez, J. Puerto and M. J. Zafra
  • Refinements of Nash Equilibria in View of Jealous or Friendly Behavior of Players
    A. Rusinowska
  • Time-Consistent Solution of a Cooperative Group Pursuit Game
    S. Tarashnina
  • Household Economies with Infinitely Many Agents: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    A. Wieczorek
  • Discrete Time Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Players I: Decomposable Games
    A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
  • Consistency for Proportional Solutions
    E. Yanovskaya

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 4 * Number 1 * March 2002
CONTENTS
  • The Dynamics of Cooperation
    F. E. Ouardighi
  • A Differential Game Approach to Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection
    J. Hofbauer and G. Sorger
  • Can Herding Explain Cyclic Co-Movement?
    B. Sussmuth
  • Fish Wars on the High Seas: A Straddling Stock Competition Model
    R. W. McKelvey, L. K. Sandal and S. I. Steinshamn
  • A Dynamic Game of Offending and Law Enforcement
    T.Pent, G. Feichtinger and G. Tragler

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 3 * Number 4 * December 2001
CONTENTS
  • Stationary Strategies in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
    J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman and 0. J. Vrieze
  • The Dynamics of the Nash Correspondence and ra-Player Stochastic Games
    E. Solan
  • Advertising in a Competitive Product Line
    G. E. Fruchter
  • Two Characterisations of the Lexicographic Egalitarian Solution
    C. Chang and Y.-A. Hwang
  • A Stackelberg Game of Innovation Diffusion: Pricing, Advertising and Subsidy Strategies
    L. De Cesare and A. Di Liddo
  • Efficiency in Dynamic Entry Games: The Case of Quantity Competitions
    R. Lahmandi-Ayed
  • A Co-Marginalistic Contribution Value for Set Games
    H. Sun, S. Zhang, X. Li, T. Driessen and C. Hoede

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 3 * Number 2 & 3 * June & September 2001
CONTENTS
  • Coalition Cabinets in Japan (1993-1997): A Game Theory Analysis
    R.Ono and S.Muto
  • On the Semivalues and Power Core of Cooperative TU Games
    I.Dragan and J.E.Martinez-Legaz
  • (Average-) Convexity of Common Pool and Oligopoly TU-Games
    T.S.H.Driessen and H.Meinhardt
  • Aspiration-Based Reinfircement Leading in Repeted Interaction Games: An Overview
    J.Bendor, D.Mookherjee and D.Ray
  • The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization
    Y.Funaki and T.Yamato
  • Formulation and Applications of Hierarchy Games
    M.Matsumoto
  • Characterization of Linear Mini-Max Estimators for Loss Functions of Arbitrary Power
    K.Helmes and C.Srinivasan
  • Generalizations of the Gilmore-Gomory Traveling Salesman Problem and the Gilmore-Gomory Scheme: A Survey
    S.N.Kabali
  • The Two-Sided Matching Problem. Origin, Development and Current Issues
    D.Gale
  • Pivoting Algorithms for Some Classes of Stochastic Games: A Survey
    S.R.Mohan, S.K.Neogy and T.Parthasarathy

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 3 * Number 1 * March 2001
CONTENTS
  • Collecting Information to Improve Decision-Making
    R.Brânzei, S.Tijs and J.Timmer
  • Stackelberg Leadership in Marketing Channel
    S.Jørgensen, S.-P.Sigué and G.Zaccour
  • Games of Crowding
    S.Alpern and D.Reyniers
  • Equilibrium in a Discrete Exchange Economy with Regional Sub-economies
    J.C.Cesco and E.Marchi
  • Level Sets of the Value Function in Differential Games with the Homicidal Chauffeur Dynamics
    V.S.Patsko and V.L.Turova

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 2 * Number 4 * December 2000
CONTENTS
  • On Merge Properties of the Shapley Value
    J.Derks and S.Tijs
  • Learning to Face Stochastic Demand
    S.D.Flåm and M.Sandsmark
  • A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Procedure Generalizing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution to NTU Games
    G.Bergantiños, B.Casa-Méndez and M.Vázquez-Brage
  • The Positive Prekernel of A Cooperative Game
    P.Sudhölter and B.Peleg
  • A Weakened Form of Fictitious Play in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
    B. van der Genugten
  • Existence of Generalised Pareto Equilibria for Constrained Multiobjective Games
    P.Cubiotti
  • A Note on Regular Semivalues
    F.Carreras and J.Freixas

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 2 * Number 2 & 3 * June & September 2000
CONTENTS
  • Unanimity in Voting for Voters
    D.Granot, M.Mashler and J.Shalev
  • Unilateral Commitments in Finitely Repeated Games
    I.García-Jurado, L.Méndez-Naya and F.Patrone
  • Repeated Play and Newton's Method
    S.D.Flåm
  • Approximating Nash Equilibria in Nonzero-Sum Games
    E.Altman, O.Pourtalier, A.Haurie and F.Moresino
  • On a Class of Nash Equilibria with Memory Strategies for Nonzero-Sum Differential Games
    J.M.Coulomb and V.Gaitsgory
  • Double Invariance: A New Equilibrium Concept for Two-Person Dynamic Games
    P.Caravani
  • Differential Game-Theoretic Thoughts on Option Pricing and Transaction Costs
    G.J.Olsder
  • On The Compensation of Imperfect Information in Dynamic Games
    J.Shinar, T.Shima and V.Y.Glizer

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 2 * Number 1 * March 2000
CONTENTS
  • Innovation and Foreign Investment in a Dynamic Oligopoly
    M.-L.Petit, F.Sanna-Randaccio and B.Tolwinski
  • von Neumann and Morgenstern Stable Sets in a Sets Merger System
    M.P.Espinosa and E.Inarra
  • Dynamic Cooperative Games
    J.A.Filar and L.A.Petrosjan
  • Evolutionary and Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Evolutionary Games with Two Independent Decisions
    R.Cressman, A.Gaunersdorfer and J.-F.Wen
  • Does Noise Undermine the First-Mover Advantage? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example
    J.Oechssler and K.H.Schlag
  • Games Arising from Infinite Production Situations
    J.Timmer, S.Tijs and N.Llorca
  • On Some Properties of Superposition of Optimality Principles for Cooperative Games
    S.V.Chistyakov and S.Y.Mikhajlova

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 1 * Number 3 & 4 * September & December 1999
CONTENTS
  • Solution of a Delayed Information Linear Pursuit-Evadion Game with Bounded Controls
    J.Shinar and V.Y.Glizer
  • Demand-Induces Endogenous Price Leadership
    R.Amir, I.Grilo and J.Jin
  • Bounded Rationality and Alternating-Offer Bargaining
    A.Mauleon and V.J.Vannetelbosh
  • Agreement Through Threats: The Nothern Ireland Case
    S.J.Brams and J.M.Torman
  • Unique Nash Implementation for a Class of Bargaining Solutions
    W.Trokel
  • The H-strategies in Extensive Form Games
    A.N.Liapounov
  • Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered
    M.Voorneveld, P.Borm, F. van Megen, S.Tijs and G.Facchini
  • Null Players Out? Linear Values for Games with Variable Support
    J.J.M.Derks and H.H.Haller

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 1 * Number 1 * March 1999
CONTENTS
  • Applications of Game Theory to Economic Equilibrium
    G. Owen
  • Markov Strategies are Better than Stationary Strategies
    J. Flesch, F. Thuijsman and O. J. Vrieze
  • Nash Equilibria from the Correlated Equilibria Viewpoint
    S. G. Canovas, P. Hansen and B. Jaumard
  • The Egalitarian Non-k-Averaged Contribution (ENkAC-) Value for TU-Games
    T. Namekata and T. S. H. Driessen
  • Strongly Consistent Solutions to Balanced TU Games
    E. Yanovskaya
  • The Stability of Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games
    L. Xu and F. Szidarovszky
  • A Strategic Concession Game
    S. Jorgensen and D. W. K. Yeung

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INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW
Volume 1 * Number 2 * June 1999
CONTENTS
  • Equilibrium Strategies in Stochastic Games with Additive Cost and Transition Structure
    H.-U. Kuenle
  • Dynamic Stochastic Games of Resource Allocation between Production and Consumption
    V. Domansky
  • A Stochastic Bargaining Process and Corresponding One-Shot Solution Concept
    F. Szidarovszky
  • On Some Categories of Games and Corresponding Equilibria
    V. Lapitsky
  • Weighted Myerson Value
    G. Haeringer
  • On Pre-Play Negotiations and Zero-Sum Betting
    H. Perets and D. Sonsino

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ICM Millenium Lectures on Games

ICM Millenium Lectures on Games
Edited by
L.A.Petrosyan and D.W.K.Yeung

Springer-Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg New York
Printed in Germany, 2003
http://www.springer.de

CONTENTS
  • Stable Schedule Matching under Revealed Preference
    A. Alkan and D. Gale
  • Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with a Permission Structure
    Rene van den Brink
  • Moral Hazard in Teams Revisited
    B. Dong
  • Endogenous Determination of Utility Functions: An Evolutionary Approach
    A. A. Vasin
  • N-person Prisoner's Dilemma with Mutual Choice by Agent-based Modeling
    T. Yamashita and A. Ohuchi
  • Randomly-Furcating Stochastic Differential Games
    D. W. K. Yeung
  • On Modulo 2 Game
    C. Zhou
  • Bargaining in Dynamic Games
    L. A. Petrosyan
  • Extensions of Hart and Mas-Colell's Consistency to Efficient, Linear, and Symmetric Values for TU-Games
    T. Driessen and T. Radzik
  • On the Stability of Cooperation Structures
    G. Haeringer
  • Time-Consistent Imputation Distribution Procedure for Multistage Game
    V. V. Zakharov and M. B. Dementieva
  • Rationality of Final Decisions Leads to Sequential Equilibrium
    R. Ishikawa and T. Matsuhisa
  • The Core in the Presence of Externalities
    L. A. Koczy
  • Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium
    I. Milchtaich
  • Essential Components of the Set of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Generalized Games
    H. Yang
  • Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules
    R. Branzei, F. Scotti, S. Tijs and A. Torre
  • Some Variation Calculus Problems in Dynamic Games on 2D Surfaces
    A. Melikyan and N. Hovakimyan
  • On The Chinese Postman Game
    D. Granot, H. Hamers, J. Kuipers and M. Maschler
  • Farsighted Stability in Duopoly Markets with Product Differentiation
    T. Masudo and S. Muto
  • International Emissions Trading with Agent-Based Simulation and Web-Based Gaming
    H. Mizuta and Y. Yamagata
  • Comparison of two Economic Models for a Business-to-Business Exchange
    N. Zenkevich and S. Huang
  • Computability of Nash Equilibrium
    H. Tashiro
  • Numerical Algorithm for Solving Cross-Coupled Miltiparameter Algebraic Riccati Equations of Multimodeling Systems Related to Nash Games
    H. Mukaidani, T. Shimomura and H. Xu
  • Effects of Symmetry on Paradoxes in Non-Cooperative Distributed Computing
    H. Kameda and Y. Hosokawa
  • Computation of Stackelberg Trajectories in a Class of Linear Differential Games on Plane
    S. Osipov and A. Kleimenov
  • A Game Theoretic Approach to Value Information in Data Mining
    Y. Saygin, A. Reisman and Y. T. Wang

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. I

Nova Science Books and Jrnls
227 Main Street, Suite 100
Huntington, NY 11743
Tel: 631-424-6682: Fax: 631-424-4666
Novascience@earthlink.net
http://www.nexusworld.com/nova

CONTENTS
  • Preface
    L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
  • The Game Theoretic Approach to H ? Optimal Control
    P.Bernhard
  • On a Mix Game
    A.Y.Garnaev
  • The Game Theoretic Approach to a Problem of Environmental Pollution
    O.A.Malafeyev and V.V.Popov
  • The Solution of Russian Black Jack
    V.V.Mazalov
  • The Time Consistency (Dynamic Stability) in Differential Games with a Discount Factor
    L.A.Petrosjan
  • Upper Estimation of the Value of Differential Game with Information Time Lag
    T.V.Slobodinskaya
  • Approximate Nash Strategies and Suboptimal Team Solutions in Markov Chains with Weakly Coupled Decision Makers
    R.Srikant and T.Basar
  • Game Theoretic Model of the Tax Inspection Organization
    A.A.Vazin and O.Agapova
  • Stackelberg Differential Games and the Problem of Time Consistency
    V.V.Zakharov
  • Two Person Stopping Games with Priority for One of the Players
    E.Z.Ferenstein
  • One Approach to the construction of the Time Consistent Optimality Principles in N-Person Differential Games
    D.V.Kuzutin
  • Single-Sector Stochastic Model of Economics with Perfect Competition
    O.A.Malafeyev and S.A.Nemnyugin
  • Game-Theoretic Model of Preference
    V.V.Mazalov
  • Game-Theoretic Model of Technology Cartels
    M.L.Petit and B.Tolwinski
  • Integral and Differential Principles in N-Person Differential Games
    L.A.Petrosjan
  • Information Structures and Perfect Information in Simply Exchange Games
    M.Sakaguchi
  • The Priorities of Controls in Pursuit Games
    N.M.Slobozhanin
  • Stackelberg Optimality and Environment Protection
    V.V.Zakharov
  • A Game-Teoretic Model of Divisible Good Bargaining
    N.A.Zenkevich and S.N.Voznyuk

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. II
CONTENTS
  • A Game Form Model of a Dynamic Multipolar International Conflict among Nations
    Bjorn Ebbesen
  • An Infiltration Game on a Circumference
    Andrej Yu. Garnarv and Galina Yu. Garnaeva
  • An Approach to Defining Solution Concept in N-Person Nonantagonistic Positional Differential Games
    Anatoly F. Kleimenov
  • The Simple Pursuit by a Few Objects on the Multidimensional Sphere
    Alexander M. Kovshov
  • Dynamic Games with Optimal Stopping
    Vladimir F. Mazalov
  • On Two Person Full-Information Best Choice Problem with Imperfect Observation
    Peter Neumann, Zdzislaw Porosinski and Krzystof Szajowski
  • Stochastic Strategies in Differential Games with Incomplete Information
    Tatyana V. Slobodinskaya
  • Dynamic Pursuit Game Dip Sonor and Its Computerization
    Igor L. Bratchikov
  • Some Game-Theoretical Models of Conflict in Finance
    Vladimir M. Bure and Oleg A. Malafeyev
  • On the Existence of the Coalition Set Core
    Alexander A.Vazin and Vladimir A. Gurvich
  • Evolution and Game-Theoretic Rationality
    Jorgen W. Weibull
  • A Differential Game Model for Optimal Price Subsidy of New Technologies
    Georges Zaccour
  • Constructions of Nonsmooth Analysis in Numerical Methods for Solving Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
    Svetlana V. Grigorjeva, Alexander A. Tarasjev, Vladimir N. Ushakov and Alexander A. Uspenskii
  • The Distribution of Voting Power in the UN
    William Kerby and Frank Gobeler
  • Multiple Search Game with Nonmovable Hyder
    Teturo Kamae
  • Game Theoretical Model of Harvesting Two Species of Fish
    Ekaterina Kunshenko and Viktor Zafharov
  • Game with Optimal Stopping of Random Walks
    Vladimir V. Mazalov
  • Game with Several Pursuers and One Evader with Discrete Observations
    Arik Melikyan and Odile Pourtallier
  • Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs
    Leon A. Petrosjan and Tamaki Tanaka
  • Contraction of Attainability Domains in a Game of Pursuit
    Sergey E. Miheev
  • A Game Theoretiv Model og the Decision-Making Process within International Economic Organizations
    Bernard Gauthier and Leon A. Petrosjan

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. III
CONTENTS
  • Regret Concept in Noncooperative Games
    A.E. Bardin
  • The Problem of Avoidance for Controlled Dynamic Objects
    A.A.Chikrii
  • The Regularized Shapley Value for a Bin Packing Game
    E.V.Eguizarova
  • Search Problems In 1-Sceletons of Regular Polihedrons
    F.V.Fomin, P.A.Golovach, N.N.Petrov
  • Game-Theoretical Model of the Assambly Line Balancing Problem
    J.Kaluski
  • Game-Theoretical Model of a Board Election
    M.Kultina
  • On the Consistency of Optimal Behavior in Extensive Games
    D.V.Kuzutin, O.P.Osokina, I.A.Romanenko
  • Two-Person Hi-Lo Poker-Stud and Drow, 11
    V.V.Mazalov and M. Sakaguchi
  • Agreeable Solutions in Differential Games
    L.A.Petrosjan
  • Group Pursuit with Phase Restrictions
    N.N.Petrov
  • Nash Equilibria in Differential Pursuit Game with One Pursuer and m Evaders
    S.I.Tarashnina
  • Equilibrium in Non-Cooperative Game
    K.S.Vaisman
  • Nash Equilibrium Routing in Ring Networks
    N.S.Vasiliev
  • Set-Valued Analogues of the Prenucleolus
    E.Yanovskaya
  • An Isoperimetric Differential Game
    D.W.-K.Yeung
  • Non-Cooperative Games under Uncertainity
    V.I.Zhukovsky, V.S.Molostvov, and K.S.Vaisman

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. IV
CONTENTS
  • On a Partial Information Multiple Selection Problem
    K. Ano
  • Normalized Banzhaf Value and the Banzhaf Share Function
    R. van den Brink and G. van den Laan
  • Potential and consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games
    I.Dragan
  • The Greedy Bankruptcy Game: an Alternative Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem
    T.S.H.Driessen
  • Game Problems on Rotation Surfaces
    N.Hovakimyan and L.Harutunian
  • Representation Games
    W.Kerby and F.Gobeler
  • On Probabilities of Pure Strategy n-Tuples in Non-Cooperative Games
    V.L.Kreps and N.N.Vorob`ev
  • Strong (N-1)-Equilibrium. Concepts and Axiomatic Characterizations
    D.V.Kuzutin
  • An Optimal Stopping of Random Walks Game with Reflection
    V.V.Mazalov and E.A.Kochetov
  • Note on the Core and Quasicore of Cooperative Games
    S.Pechersky
  • A Unique Nash Solution for the Games with Perfect Information
    L.A.Petrosjan
  • Nash-Hurwitz Equilibrium for Non-Cooperative Games
    L.V.Smirnova
  • Unimprovable Arbitration Solution under Uncertainty
    K.S.Vaisman and S.S.Mishin
  • Continuous Take-Away Games
    S.V.Vinnichenko
  • The Proper Sharley Value
    N.N.Vorob`ev and A.V.Liapounov
  • On Communication in Cooperation Game: a Survey
    O.Voshtina
  • Communication Can Ease Prisoners` Dilemma
    J.Watanabe
  • Selectors of the Core and Consistency Properties
    V.V.Zakharov and O-Hun Kwon

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. V
CONTENTS
  • The Telephone Coordination Game
    S.Alpern and M.Pikounis
  • Nonsymmetric Indices of Power and their Application to the House of Councilors in Japan
    K.Ano, S.Seko and T.Suzuki
  • To Work or not to Work: a Note on Incentives
    K.Borissov and S.Pechersky
  • Multiple Scenario Competitive Markets
    F.R.Fernandez, L.Monroy, A.Marmol and J.Puerto
  • Value of Information in Optimal Stopping Games
    A.Y.Garnaev
  • Optimal Output Strategies in a Two-Stage Game with Entry, Learning-by-Doing, and Spillovers
    S.Jorgensen and G.Zaccour
  • A Minimum Taxrate Core Allocation of Bin Packing Games
    T.Matsui
  • Guarenteed Imputation in the Game without Side Payments
    E.N.Opletayeva
  • The Value of Dynamic Games with Partial Cooperation
    L.Petrosyan and D.Ayoshin
  • Repeated Game of Criminal versus Police -- Incomplete-Information Case
    M.Sakaguchi
  • Guaranteed Imputation for the Linear-Quadratic Game Under Uncertainty
    E.B.Smirnova
  • Hurwitz's Principle for one class of the Non-Cooperative Games
    L.V.Smirnova
  • N-Person Games on Territory
    Y.Teraoka and H.Hohjo
  • Demand Operations in MinimumSpanning Tree Games
    M.Tsurumi, T.Minamiura, T.Tanino, M.Inuiguchi
  • Take-Away Games with a Constant Lower Restriction
    S.V.Vinnichenko
  • Dynamic Games with Continuum of Players Modeling "Tragedy of the Commons"
    A.Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
  • Constructing the Nash Equilibtium in a Game Statement of Carnot Duopoly
    A.Zavarin

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. VI
CONTENTS
  • The Telephone Coordination Game
    S.Alpern and M.Pikounis
  • Time-Consistent Solution for the Game of Information Trading
    E. Eguiazarova
  • Game Problems for Systems with Volterra Evolution. Fractal Games
    S.D. Eidelman and A.A Chikrii
  • Parlour Games with a Threshold
    A.Y. Garnaev
  • Intergenerational Cooperative Solution of a Renewable Resource Extractoin Game
    S. Jorgensen and D.W. Yeung
  • On a Model of Two-card Poker
    V.V. Mazalov and I.S. Makhankov
  • About one Pursuit Problem with Many Evaders
    N.N. Petrov
  • On Vector -Valued Markov Games
    Piskuric
  • On a Solution of Cooperative Games under Uncertainty
    A.O. Remizov
  • Optimal Stopping Games where Players have Weighted Privilege
    M. Sakaguchi
  • Pure-Strategy Eguilibrium in a Location Game with Discriminatory Pricing
    M. Sakaguchi
  • Solution of the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Finite Memory in Hierarchical Statement
    A.A. Semenishchev
  • Convergence of Learning Algorithms for Games on Networks
    M.A.Sukhotina and L.A. Petrosjan
  • Sustraction Games
    S.V. Vinnichenko
  • Optimality Conditions forOne0Shot Matrix Games
    Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon
  • Auction Games and Intergrative Imputations
    N.A. Zenkevich

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. VII
CONTENTS
  • The Game Problem of Soft Landing
    J. Albus, A. Meystel, A. Chikrii, A. Belousov and A. Kozlov
  • A Dual Approach to Compromise Values
    J.M. Bilbao, E. Lebron, A. Jimmez-Losada and S.H. Tijs
  • Randomized Optimal Stopping Rules for a Class of Stopping Games
    V. Domansky
  • Multi-objective Linear Production Games
    F.R. Fernandez, M.A. Hinojosa and J. Puerto
  • Tchebycheff Systems and Analysis of Games Versus Nature on the Unit Square
    A.Y. Golubin
  • Simple Dynamics from Complex Behavior in Duopoly Pricing Games
    S.Huang, K. Anderson and Y. Yang
  • A Study to Obtain a Realistic Game Solution in an Air Combat Game
    F. Imado and J. Shinar
  • Conflict and Co-operation in Fisheries: A Game Theory Approach
    M. Lindroos and V. Kaitala
  • Guidance Law Schedulingy
    S. Le Menec
  • Non-symmetric Solution of an Arbitration Game
    V.V. Mazalov and A.A. Zabelin
  • Nash Equilibria Refinements for Multistage and Repeated Games
    L.A. Petrosjan
  • Discretization, Nonlinear and Bilevel Programming in Pursuit-evasion Games
    T. Raivio and H. Ehtamo
  • Random Assignment and Uncertain Employment in Optimal Stopping of Markov Processes
    D. Ramsey and K. Szajowski
  • Optimal Stopping Games by Equal-weight Players for Poisson-arriving Offers
    M. Sakaguchi
  • Intermediation and the Poor Property Rights Protection
    D. Shaposhnik
  • Asymptotics for Singularly Perturbed Differential Games
    N.N. Subbotina

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Game Theory and Applications

GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. VIII

Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
400 Oser Ave, Suite 1600
Hauppage, New York 11788-3619
Tel: 631-231-7269; Fax: 631-231-8175
e-mail: Novascience@earthlink.net
http://www.novapublishers.com

CONTENTS
  • The Description of Game Actions in Cluedo
    Hans P. van Ditmarsch
  • Modified Banzhaf Index for Voting Games
    R. Endo, K. Ano, T. Matsui
  • Classification of Matrices by Means of Envelopes for Bicriteria Matrix Game
    M. Higuchi, T. Tanaka
  • Epistemic Logic: A Survey
    W. van der Hoek, R. Verbrugge
  • Multistage Arbitration Game with Random Offers
    V.V. Mazalov, M. Sakaguchi, A.A. Zabelin
  • Game Theoretic Modeling of Hierarchical Control of Sustainable Development
    G. A. Ougolnitsky
  • The Dummy Paradox of the Bargaining Set
    B. Peleg, P. Sudholter
  • New Classes of Solutions in Multistage Games with Applications to "Prisoner's" Dilemma
    L. A. Petrosjan, L.V. Grauer
  • Ethical Behavior as Transformation of Utility
    W.H. Ruckle, K. Kikuta
  • On Certain Generalization of Rubinstein's Bargaining Model
    A.Rusinowska
  • Consistency and its Converse in Assignment Games
    M. Toda
  • Price Competition in Olygopoly: the Conditions of Convergence to and Deviation from Walrasian equilibrium
    A. A. Vasin
  • Overlapping Generations Randomly-Fur cat ing Stochastic Differential Games: Intertemporal Strategic Behavior under Stochastic Dynamics and Uncertain Payoffs
    D. W.K Yeung
  • Games as People Play and How to Form Winning Strategies
    P.L. Yu, C.Y. ChiangLin
  • Geometrical Properties of the Core, Subcore and Nucleolus
    V. V. Zakharov, A.N. Akimova

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. IX
CONTENTS
  • Numerical Studies on Paradoxes in Noncooperative Distributed Computer Systems
    S.F. El-Zoghdy, H. Kameda, J. Li
  • On the Borel and von Neumann Poker Models
    C. Ferguson, T.S. Ferguson
  • Axiomatic Characterization of Boolean Vote Aggregators
    S. Lahiri
  • N-Person Best-Choice Game with Voting
    V. V. Mazalov, M. V. Banin
  • A Fishery Game Model with Age-Distributed Population: Reserved Territory Approach
    V.V. Mazalov, A.N. Rettieva
  • The Effects of Incomplete Information in Stochastic Common-Stock Harvesting Games
    R. McKelvey, P. V. Golubtsov
  • Two-level Imitative Problems in Stock Markets and Bayesian Estimation of Credibility Parameters
    F. Mignanego, S. Mulinacci
  • On Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation
    A.S. Nowak, P. Szajowski
  • Cooperative Solution for Games with Random Duration
    L.A. Petrosjan, E.V. Shevkoplyas
  • Best-choice Games where Arbitration Comes in
    M. Sakaguchi
  • A "Quantitative" Minimax Theorem
    M. V. Stefanescu, M. Ferrara
  • On Bruss' Stopping Problem with General Gain Function
    A. Suchwalko, K. Szajowski
  • Semi-Definite Programming Approach for Bandwidth Allocation and Routing in Networks
    C. Touati, E. Altman and J. Galtier
  • Cournot Equilibrium and Competition via Supply Functions
    A. Vasin, N. Durakovich and P. Vasina
  • Some Results on Convergence of Learning Algorithms for Games on Networks
    S. V. Vinnichenko
  • Endogenous-Horizon Randomly Furcating Differential Games
    D.W.K. Yeung
  • The Mean Value with Evaluation Measures and a Zero-sum Stopping Game with Fuzzy Values
    Y. Yoshida, M. Yasuda, J. Nakagami and M. Kurano
  • A Game Theoretic Model for the Network Service
    V. V. Zakharov, V. V. Melnikov
  • Imputations in Cooperative Games under Uncertainty
    V.I. Zhukovskiy, V.S. Molostvov, S.N. Sachkov and L.V. Smirnova

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GAME THEORY and APPLICATIONS
Edited by
L.A.Petrosjan and V.V.Mazalov
Vol. X
CONTENTS
  • Graph Searching Problems with the Counteraction
    V. Y. Andrianov and N.N. Petrov
  • Competition for Staff between Two Departments
    V.J.Baston and A. Y. Garnaev
  • A Competitive Prediction Number Game Under Unsymmetrical Conditions
    D. V, Belkovskii and A. Y. Garnaev
  • Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot under Precommitment
    M. Breton, A. Turki and G. Zaccour
  • One Approach to Solution of Complex Game Problems for Some Quasilinear Evolutionary Systems
    G.Ts. Chikrii
  • A Differential Game with Investment in Transport and Communication in R&D
    L. Colombo, L. Lambertini and A. Mantovani
  • Time-Consistency and the Problem of Minimal Reduction
    M. Dementieva, P. Neittaanmaki and V. Zakharov
  • Conjugate-set Game for a Nonlinear Programming Problem
    H. Kawasaki
  • A Concept of Solution for a Strategic Cooperative Game Involving Unknown Parameteres
    M. Larbani and Y. Askoura
  • A Fishery Game Model with Migration: Reserved Territory Approach
    V.V. Mazalov and A.N. Rettieva
  • Repeated Game with Constraint on the Time of Observation
    E.Z. Mokhonko
  • Value for the Game with Changing Coalitional Structure
    L.A. Petrosjan and S.I. Mamkina
  • The Redistribution Paradox and the Paradox of New Members in the German Parliament
    A. Rusinowska and A. van Deemen
  • Three-player Game of 'Keep-or-Exchange'
    M. Sakaguchi
  • Infinitely Repeated Symmetric 2 x 2-Bimatrix Games with Finite Memory of Players
    A.A. Semenishchev
  • Nonsymmetric Consistent Surplus Sharing Methods
    E. Yanovskaya

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Instructions for "International Game Theory Review"

International Game Theory Review,
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Basar, T. and G. J. Olsder (1995). Dynamic Noncooperative Theory. London: Academic Press.

Breakwell, J. V. (1989). "Time Optimal Pursuit Inside a Circle". In T. Basar and P. Bernhard (eds.). Differential Games and Applications. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 72-77.

Haurie, A., J. Krawczyk and M. Roche (1994). "Monitoring Cooperative Equilibria in a Stochastic Differential Game". Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications Vol. 3, No. 2, 173-181.

James, M. R., J. S. Baras and R. J. Elliot (1993). "Output Feedback Risk-Sensitive Control and Differential Games for Continuous-Time Nonlinear Systems". Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, San Antonio, Texas, USA, 3357-3360.


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Instructions for "Game Theory and Applications"

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