ÿþ<html> <head> <title>C1;8:0F88 </title> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=WINDOWS-1251"> <style> .amenu{ text-decoration: none; color: #663300; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Sans Serif; font-size: 14px; } .amenu:hover { text-decoration: none; color: #FF0000;font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Sans Serif; font-size: 14px; } .title{ font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Sans Serif; font-size: 18px; } a{ text-decoration: none; } a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } .text{text-align: justify; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, Sans Serif; font-size: 12px; color:#000000} td,p { font-size: 12px; color: #000000; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; margin-left:10px; margin-right:10px} </style> </head> <body bgColor=#c6bead text="#000000" leftmargin="0" rightmargin="0" topmargin="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0"> <table width="100%" border="0" align="center" height="100%"> <tr> <td bgcolor="cc9966" height="100%"> <table width="100%" border="0" align="center" height="100%"> <tr> <td colspan="3" bgcolor="FFFFFF" vAlign=down height="142"> <div align="center"><font size="3" face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" color="#660000"><b> 0D54@0 <0B5<0B8G5A:>9 B5>@88 83@ 8 AB0B8AB8G5A:8E @5H5=89</b></font></div> <div align="center"><img src="images/title.gif" width=100% height="96"></div></td> </tr> <tr> <td bgcolor="990000" height="30" width="19%">&nbsp; </td> <td bgcolor="990000" height="30" width="70%" > <div class=title><b><font color="#FFCC33">C1;8:0F88 </font></b></div> </td> <td bgcolor="990000" height="30" width="19%">&nbsp;</td> </tr> <tr> <td height="116" bgcolor="ffcc66" width="19%" vAlign="top"> <table width="140" border="0" valign="top"> <tr> <td ><b><a class= amenu href="1.htm"> :0D54@5</a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td ><b><a class= amenu href="2.htm">!>AB02 :0D54@K</a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b><a class= amenu href="4.htm">C@AK</a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td ><b><a class= amenu href="5.htm">C1;8:0F88 </a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b><a class= amenu href="6.htm">8AA5@B0F8>==K9 A>25B</a></b></td> </tr> </table> </td> <td width="70%" bgcolor="ffffcc" height=600 vAlign=top> <br> !! #'+%  "'!% " #<br> <br> " ( !25B;0=K 20=>2=K <br> <br> <table width="100%" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="1" bordercolor="#990000" borderlight="#990000" bordercolordark="#990000"> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p><b><span lang=RU>!</span></b></p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p><b><span lang=RU>2B>@K</span></b></p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p><b><span lang=RU>08<5=>20=85</span></b></p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p><b><span lang=RU>KE>4=K5 40==K5</span></b></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>1</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The  lifeline pursuit game with a pursuer team and two evaders.</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Intern. Congress on Computer Systems and Applied Mathematics CSAM 93, St.-Petersburg, 1993, Abstracts, p.101</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>2</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>On a tree person  lifeline pursuit game</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The third International Workshop «Multiple criteria problems under uncertainty». Orekhovo-Zuevo, 1994, Abstracts, p.92</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>3</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !., C4@OH>20 .</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>1 >ACI5AB28<>AB8 AB@0B5389 =0:070=8O 2 83@5 ?@>AB>3> ?@5A;54>20=8O B@5E ;8F</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>562C7. A1>@=8: =0CG=KE B@C4>2 «!;>6=K5 C?@02;O5<K5 A8AB5<K». >A:20, 74-2> >A", 1996, A.152-156</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>4</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>#AB>9G82>ABL B>B0;8B0@=>3> @568<0</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>564C=0@>4=K9 =0CG=K9 :>=3@5AA «0@>4K A>4@C65AB20 =57028A8<KE 3>AC40@AB2 =0:0=C=5 B@5BL53> BKAOG5;5B8O: @50;88 8 ?5@A?5:B82K». !0=:B-.5B5@1C@3, 1996, B>< 3, A.57-58.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>5</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The Nash equilibria in the pursuit game with one pursuer and two evaders</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>N.N.Vorob ev Memorial Conference «Game Theory and Economics». St.-Petersburg, 1996, Abstracts, p.70</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>6</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The set of Nash equilibria in a simple pursuit game with one pursuer and many evaders</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Forth International Workshop «Multiple criteria problems under uncertainty». Orekhovo-Zuevo, 1996, p.117</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>7</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Nash equilibria in a differential pursuit game with one pursuer and m evaders</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>In Journal: Game Theory and Applications. N.Y., Nova Science Publ., 1998, Vol. III, p. 115-129</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>8</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p> 02=>25A=K5 ?> MHC A8BC0F88 2 83@5 ?@>AB>3> ?@5A;54>20=8O</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>!1. «#?@02;5=85 2 A>F80;L=>-M:>=><8G5A:8E A8AB5<0E», A5@8O «>?@>AK <5E0=8:8 8 ?@>F5AA>2 C?@02;5=8O». K?.20</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>9</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !., ..5AA>=>2, ..5B@>AO=</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>>>?5@0F8O 2 @0A?@545;5==KE ?>8A:>2KE A8AB5<0E(B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>A5@>AA89A:0O =0CG=>-<5B>48G5A:0O :>=D5@5=F8O «=B5@=5B 8 A>2@5<5==>5 >1I5AB2>», !.5B5@1C@3, 1998.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>10</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Nash equilibria in a n-person pursuit game</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Proceedings of the 8-th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, 1998, Maastricht, p.583-586</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>11</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., O-Hun Kwon</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Time-consistency of the core in cooperative differential pursuit game(abstracts / B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The 6th Applied Mathematics Forum, South Korea, 2000, <a href="http://www.amf.or.kr/amf6/speaker.html">http://www.amf.or.kr/amf6/speaker.html</a></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>12</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., Petrosjan L.A., Bessonov M.B.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p> 02=>25A85 2 @0A?@545;5==KE ?>8A:>2KE A8AB5<0E</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p> :=.: !: «!8AB5<0 @0A?@545;5==>3> ?>8A:0 2 =B5@=5B». >4 @54. .0B5;O, .. 5B@>AO=, . >75=HB8;O. !.-5B5@1C@3, 2001, A.284-299</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>13</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., Petrosjan L.A., Bessonov M.B.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>An equilibrium in distributed search systems</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>In: OASIS:«Distributed Search System in the Internet». Edited by A.Patel, L.Petrosjan, W.Rosenstiel. St.-Petersburg, 2001, p.559-573</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>14</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., Filippova Yu</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Comparison of various political systems on an example of the countries of ex-USSR(Extended Abstracts, @0AH8@5==K5 B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>International Conference «Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice», St.-Petersburg, 2001, p. 219-221</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>15</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The core in a cooperative time-optimal pursuit game</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Twelfth International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, USA, 2001, Abstracts, p.86</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>16</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., O-Hun Kwon</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Time-consistency problem in a cooperative differential pursuit game</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society, 2001, Vol. 38, N2, p.56</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>17</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., O-Hun Kwon</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>On a time-consistent solution of a cooperative differential time-optimal pursuit game(article / AB0BLO)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society, Vol.39, No 5 (2002), p. 745-764</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>18</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Time-consistent solution of a cooperative group pursuit game (article / AB0BLO)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>International Game Theory Review, Vol.4, No 3 (2002), p. 301-317</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>19</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., O-Hun Kwon</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Shapley value is amazingly wayward in differential TU-games (article / AB0BLO)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Proc. of the International Congress of Mathematicians 2002 Satellite Conference on GTA. 2002. p. ???-???</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>20</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Shapley value in a differential TU-game with nonlinear payoff function(abstracts / B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Conference book of the XV Italian Meeting on Game Theory and Applications (IMGTA), Urbino, Italy, 2003, p. 116</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>21</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., Pankratova Y.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Punishment strategy in one pursuit game(abstracts / B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Conference book of the XV Italian Meeting on Game Theory and Applications (IMGTA), Urbino, Italy, 2003, p. 84</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>22</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., Pankratova Y.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>How many people can be controlled in a group pursuit game (article / AB0BLO)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Journal "Theory and Decision". Vol. 56, 2_2, 165  181, 2004, Kluwer Academic Publishers</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>23</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., Pankratova Y.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>How many people can be controlled in a group pursuit game (article / AB0BLO) </p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The volume «Essays on Cooperative Games - in honor of Guillermo Owen», 2004, Kluwer Academic Publishers (reprint from "Theory and Decision")</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>24</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S., Fedorov S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Game-theoretical model of the international tax competition (abstracts / B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Second World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 2004, Marseille, France </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>25</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !., @8H8= .</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>5B>4 ?>AB@>5=8O <=>65AB20 @02=>25A89 ?> MHC 2 A;CG05 ?5@5<5==>9 <0B@8FK 83@K (AB0BLO)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>@>F5AAK C?@02;5=8O 8 CAB>9G82>ABL: "@C4K 35-9 =0CG=>9 :>=D5@5=F88 0A?8@0=B>2 8 ABC45=B>2. 2004. A. 573  578. </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>26</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>On a new solution concept in cooperative transferable utility games(abstracts / B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>II Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING2)</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>27</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !., @8H8= .</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p> 5H5=85 15A:>0;8F8>==KE 83@ 42CE ;8F A 87<5=ONI8<8AO 2> 2@5<5=8 ?@54?>GB5=8O<8(AB0BLO)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>8=0<8G5A:85 83@K 8 8E ?@8;>65=8O: !1>@=8: B@C4>2 <>;>4KE CG5=KE. />4 @54. .. 5B@>AO=0 8 ... 0@=0520.- !1.: $0:C;LB5B ?@8:;04=>9 <0B5<0B8:8  ?@>F5AA>2 C?@02;5=8O !1#, , 2006.  A.91-96</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>28</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !., !<8@=>20 .</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>>2K5 @5H5=8O 2 :>>?5@0B82=KE 83@0E 157 ?>1>G=KE ?;0B5659</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>VI 564C=0@>4=0O =0CG=>-?@0:B8G5A:0O :>=D5@5=F8O «:BC0;L=K5 ?@>1;5<K M:>=><8:8 8 =>2K5 B5E=>;>388 ?@5?>4020=8O (!<8@=>2A:85 'B5=8O)», 2006.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>29</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>>2K5 @5H5=8O 2 :>>?5@0B82=KE 83@0E 157 ?>1>G=KE ?;0B5659</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>VI 564C=0@>4=0O =0CG=>-?@0:B8G5A:0O :>=D5@5=F8O «:BC0;L=K5 ?@>1;5<K M:>=><8:8 8 =>2K5 B5E=>;>388 ?@5?>4020=8O (!<8@=>2A:85 'B5=8O)», 2006.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>30</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !., !<8@=>20 .</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>#?@>I5==>5 <>48D8F8@>20==>5 n-O4@> 8 53> A2O7L A 25:B>@>< (5?;8 2 :>>?5@0B82=KE "-83@0E(B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>VI 564C=0@>4=0O =0CG=>-?@0:B8G5A:0O :>=D5@5=F8O «:BC0;L=K5 ?@>1;5<K M:>=><8:8 8 =>2K5 B5E=>;>388 ?@5?>4020=8O (!<8@=>2A:85 'B5=8O)», 2007.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>31</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The simplified modified nucleolus(abstracts / B578AK)</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>III Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING3)</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>32</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The simplified modified nucleolus and the Shapley value</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Journal TOP (an international journal of Operations Research) (?@8=OB0 : ?C1;8:0F88) </p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>33</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.., 0=:@0B>20 /..</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>#A;>2=> M:2820;5=B=K5 83@K :0: 8=AB@C<5=B ?>AB@>5=8O n-O4@0 2 "-83@0E</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>0B5@80;K VI <564C=0@>4=>9 =0CG=>-?@0:B8G5A:>9 :>=D5@5=F88 «:BC0;L=K5 ?@>1;5<K M:>=><8:8 8 =>2K5 B5E=>;>388 ?@5?>4020=8O (!<8@=>2A:85 'B5=8O)», !1, ,  (, 2007. A. 168-170. 2007.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>34</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.., !<8@=>20 ..</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>#?@>I5==>5 <>48D8F8@>20==>5 N-O4@> 8 53> A2O7L A 4@C38<8 @5H5=8O<8 :>>?5@0B82=KE "-83@</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>@>F5AAK C?@02;5=8O 8 CAB>9G82>ABL: "@C4K 399 <564C=0@>4=>9 =0CG=>9 :>=D5@5=F88 0A?8@0=B>2 8 ABC45=B>2. !1: 74-2> !1#. 2008. A. 498-502.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>35</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.., !<8@=>20 ..</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The simplified modified nucleolus and the Bankruptcy problem</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The second international conference Game Theory and Management (GTM2008). St.Petersburg. 2008. p. 198-199.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>36</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.., 0=:@0B>20 /..</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Time-consistency of the core in group pursuit games</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The second international conference Game Theory and Management (GTM2008). St.Petersburg. 2008. p. 216.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>37</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The International Journal on Operations Research. TOP. Special Issue of SING3. 2010.V. 17. DOI: 10.1007/s11750-009-0118-z. 2010.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>38</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., N. Smirnova</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>About a new solution of cooperative TU-games</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>Materials of 24th European Conference on operational research, July 11-14, 2010. 2010. p. 220.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>39</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.., !<8@=>20 ..</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>!5<59AB2> a-N-O45@ :0: :>=F5?F8O @5H5=8O :>>?5@0B82=KE 83@</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>0B5@80;K A5@>AA89A:>9 :>=D5@5=F88 «#AB>9G82>ABL 8 ?@>F5AAK C?@02;5=8O», 8N;L 2010. 2010. AB@. 179-180.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>40</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., N. Smirnova</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>The Generalized Nucleolus as a new solution concept of cooperative TU-games</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Fourth International Conference «Game Theory and Management», St.Petersburg. 2010. p. 221-223.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>41</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., Ya. Pankratova, I. Marchenko</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Cooperative solutions for a group pursuit game between a pursuer and m evaders</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The fourth International Conference «Game Theory and Management», St.Petersburg. 2010. p.123-124.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>42</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>"0@0H=8=0 !.., !<8@=>20 ..</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>1 >4=>< >1>1I5=88 N-O4@0 2 :>>?5@0B82=KE 83@0E</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>8A:@5B=K9 0=0;87 8 8AA;54>20=85 >?5@0F89. 2011. T.18. ! 4. !. 77-93.</p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td width="4%" class="Normal"> <p>43</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>Tarashnina S.I., N. Smirnova.</p> </td> <td width="25%" class="Normal"> <p>On some properties of the [0,1]-Nucleolus in cooperative TU-games</p> </td> <td width="46%" class="Normal"> <p>The Fifth International Conference «Game Theory and Management», St.Petersburg, June, 2011. 2011.</p> </td> </tr> </table> </td> <td width="19%"bgcolor="ffcc66" height="61" vAlign="top"> <table width="140" border="0" valign="top"> <tr> <td ><b><a class= amenu href="news.htm">>2>AB8</a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td ><a class= amenu href="8.htm"><b>"5:CI0O 8=D>@<0F8O </b></a></td> </tr> <tr> <td ><b><a class= amenu href="7.htm">$>B>0;L1><</a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b><a class= amenu href="www.isdgrus.ru">ISDGRus</a></b></td> </tr> <tr> <td><b><a class= amenu href="index.htm">Home</a></b></td> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> <tr> </tr> </table> </td> </tr> </table> </body> </html>