June 21-24, 2001   

General information
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Call for papers
Preliminary Program
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PRELIMINARY OF CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

  • Simple Semiorders and Choice Rationalizable by Utility Function with Additive Non-negative Error Function
    Fuad Aleskerov
  • Egalitarian Allocations for Cooperative Games
    Javier Arin
  • Some Characterizations of Egalitarian Solutions on Classes of TU-Games
    Javier Arin, Jeroen Kuipers, Dries Vermeulen
  • An Alternative Approach to Some Rules of Choice Under Complete Uncertainty
    Ricardo Arlegi
  • Self-Selection Consistent Functions
    Salvador Barbera , Carmen Bevia
  • Measuring Autonomy Freedom as "Informed Choice"
    Sebastiano Bavetta, Vitorocco Peragine
  • Housing Market with Indi.erences: the Priority Method
    Anna Bogomolnaia, Rajat Deb
  • Efficient Fair Division: Help the Worst Of or Avoid Envy?
    Steven J. Brams, Daniel King
  • Resolving Mergers' Social Issues: a Fair-Division Approach
    Steven J. Brams, Maxim S. Kulikov
  • The Value of Information in Political Decision-Making Situations
    Rodica Branzei, Stef Tijs
  • The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession
    Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber
  • A Class of Consistent Share Functions for Games in Coalition Structure
    Rene van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan
  • Some Results on the Kernel and the Prekernel
    Chih Chang
  • Constructing Extensions of Utility Functions
    Pavel Chebotarev
  • Model of Negotiation in Multi Agent Systems Based on the Games Theory with Fuzzy Coalitions
    Jose C. Romero Cortes, Leonid Sheremetov
  • The Condorcet Paradox: a Review of Research Results
    Ad Van Deemen
  • Knowledge Actions in Games and Multiagent Systems
    Hans P. van Ditmarsch
  • The Paretian Liberal in an Intuitionistic Fuzzy Context
    Dinko Dimitrov
  • Randomized Optimal Stopping Rules for a Class of Stopping Games
    Victor Domansky
  • A Multiplicative Potential Approach to Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games: the Multiplicativily Proportional Value
    Theo S. H. Driessen
  • Cores of Stochastic Cooperative Games
    Francisco R. Fernandez, Justo Puerto, Mara J. Zafra
  • Acting Autonomously Versus not Acting Heteronomously
    Martin van Hees
  • Characterizing Knowledge States
    Wiebe van der Hoek, Elias Thijsse
  • An Axiomatization of the Plurality Ranking Rule
    Eliora van der Hout, Annemarie ter Veer
  • False Beliefs and Decision Making
    Mamoru Kaneko
  • Classifcation of Types of Societal Conflicts and Characterization of Their Resolution Processes Based on Deontic Logic
    Osamu Katai, Kentaro Toda, Hiroshi Kawakami
  • Continuous Representations of Topological Effectivity Functions
    Hans Keiding
  • Proportionally Marginalist Values for TU Games
    Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, Theo S. H. Driessen
  • A Nonempty Extension of the Core
    Laszlo Koczy
  • A Recursive Approach for Solving Coalition Formation Problems
    J. Kuipers, N. Olaizola
  • On More than Existence of Maximal Elements
    Nikolai S. Kukushkin
  • Axiomatic Characterization of Weighted Boolean Vote Aggregators
    Somdeb Lahiri
  • Electoral Competition, Information and a Strategic Electorate
    Jean-Francois Laslier, Karine Van der Straeten
  • Asymptotic Optimality in Markov Processesand Stochastic Games
    Andrey N. Liapounov
  • Games of Timing with Additional Discontinuity Lines
    Michael M. Lutsenko
  • On Transfer Properties of Power Indices
    Marcin Malawski
  • A New Characteristic Number for Voting Games
    Mathieu Martin, Vincent Merlin
  • Communication Leading to Nash Equilibrium II: the Case of p-belief System Takashi Matsuhisa
  • Large Non-Symmetris Solution of an Arbitrarion Game
    Vladimir V. Mazalov, Anatoliy A. Zabelin
  • Nonsymmetric Equal Sacrifice Solutions for Allocation Problems
    Natalia I. Naumova
  • On the Complexity of Coalitional Reasoning
    Marc Pauly
  • On "Gauge" Excess Function for NTU-games: Axiomatic Approach
    Sergei Pechersky
  • Nash Consistent Representation of Constitutions: a Reaction to the Gibbard Paradox
    Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
  • Strong Nash Equilibrium in Multistage and Repeated Games
    Leon A. Petrosjan
  • On One Problem of Pursuit of a Group of Evaders
    N. N. Petrov, D. A. Vagin
  • Games with Ordered Outcomes
    V. V. Rosen
  • Paradoxes of Voting Power in Dutch Politics
    Agnieszka Rusinowska, Ad Van Deemen
  • On Certain Bargaining Model with Simultaneous Moves of the Players
    Agnieszka Rusinowska, Stef Tijs
  • Bounded Interpersonal Inferences and Decision Making
    Nobu-Yuki Suzuki
  • About a Cooperative Differential Time-Optimal Pursuit Game
    Svetlana Tarashnina
  • Cost Sharing in a Joint Project by Asymmetric Agents
    Stef Tijs
  • On Coalitional Game Contexts and Their Concept Lattices
    Stefano Vannucci
  • On Week NM-Solutions
    Valery A. Vasil'ev
  • The Harsanyi Set for Cooperative TU-games
    Valeri Vasil'ev, Gerard van der Laan
  • Evolutionary Games and Determination of Utility Functions
    Alexander A. Vasin
  • Construction of Time-Consistent Imputations in Differential Games
    Ralph Villiger, Leon A. Petrosjan
  • Free Trade and the Environment: a Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Shlomo Weber, Hans Wiesmeth Game-Theoretic Methods in Infinite Household Economies
    Andrzej Wieczorek
  • Static and Dynamic Equilibria in Games with Continuum of Players
    Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
  • Consistency for Proportional Solutions
    Elena Yanovskaya
  • Proportional Time-Consistent Solutions in Differential Games
    David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosjan
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